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The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia
War Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in
Prosecutor v. Tadic
GEOFFREY R. WATSON*

On October 2, 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia' held that the Tribunal
has jurisdiction to try Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, for war crimes
and crimes against humanity.2 The Appeals Chamber ruled that
the establishment of the Tribunal was lawful, that the Tribunal's
primacy over national courts does not violate international law,
and that the Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to crimes committed in
internal armed conflict.3 The decision cleared the way for the first
international war crimes trial since Nuremberg and Tokyo. The
Appeals Chamber was right to uphold the validity of the Tribunal
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law,
1995-present; Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, 1991-present;
Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, 1987-91. My thanks to Mike Noone and Tony Perez
for their helpful comments.
1. This is the official abbreviated title for the Tribunal See U.N. Press Release, No. IT/
13, Nov. 30, 1993, and No. IT/30, Feb. 11, 1994. The full title of the Tribunal is The
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991.
2. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995). reprinted in
35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter Decision of the Appeals Chamber]. The Decision of the
Appeals Chamber is available electronically on the world wide Web at http'J/
www.igc.apc.org/tribunal [hereinafter Tribunal's Web Site].
3. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 146 (disposition), paras. 9-48
(opinion on validity of establishment of Tribunal), paras. 49-64 (on primacy of Tribunal),
paras. 65-145 (on subject-matter jurisdiction). The decision revised and affirmed an earlier
decision of the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber,
Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Aug. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter Decision of the Trial Chamber]. The Decision of the Trial Chamber is also
available on the Tribunal's Web Site, supra note 2.
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and its primacy over national courts, but, as this article will argue,
the Chamber's sweeping interpretation of the Tribunal's jurisdiction raises some troubling questions.
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution purporting to "establish an international tribunal for the sole
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991." 4 Following its wellestablished practice, the Council asserted that it was acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter without citing any particular provision of Chapter VII. The resolution incorporates without amendment the Secretary-General's proposed Statute for the Tribunal.In addition, the resolution
requires that all states "shall cooperate
6

fully" with the Tribunal.

Eleven judges sit on the Tribunal, which has its seat at the

Hague. 7 The judges are elected by the General Assembly from a
list submitted by the Security Council. 8 No two judges may be
4. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993). See also S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (deciding that such a tribunal "shall be
established," and requesting the Secretary-General to submit proposals for
implementation of the decision). Earlier, the Council had called on states and
international organizations to submit information on war crimes to the Council, see S.C.
Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1771 (Aug. 13, 1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1470 (1992) and thereafter asked the Secretary-General to establish
a Commission of Experts to examine the information submitted and to conduct its own
investigation. See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
780 (Oct. 6, 1992), reprinted in 2 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide
to the International Criminal Tibunal for the Former Yugoslavia 145 (1995).
5. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 4, para. 1. The Statute of the International Tribunal
[hereinafter Tribunal Statute] is set out as an annex to the Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163 (1993) [hereinafter
Report of the Secretary-General].
6. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 4, para. 4. For a useful analysis of the creation,
structure, and jurisdiction of the ribunal, see James C. O'Brien, Current Developments,
The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Former Yugoslavia, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 639 (1993).
7. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, arts. 12, 31. The Tribunal may sit elsewhere if
necessary to serve the interests of justice. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 4,
U.N. Doc. 1T/32, (Mar. 14, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 493 (1994)[hereinafter Rules of
Procedure].
8. Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 13.
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nationals of the same State.' There are two Trial Chambers composed of three judges each, along with one Appeals Chamber composed of five judges.10 The judges elect a President who handles
administrative matters and presides over the Appeals Chamber."
The Rules of Procedure establish that judges will periodically
rotate among these chambers.u
The Statute also creates a Prosecutor and a Registry. These,
together with the Chambers, constitute the three organs of the Tribunal. In terms of respective administrative and legal functions,
the role of the prosecutor is defined in article 16(1). This article
provides that the Prosecutor "shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution" of crimes falling under the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Similarly, article 16(2) provides that the Prosecutor "shall
act independently as a separate organ" of the Tribunal. The first
Prosecutor is Richard Goldstone, a highly regarded South African
jurist.' 3 Although the Statute does not establish a defense counsel,
it does provide for a right to counsel and for appointment of counsel in the event that the accused lacks "sufficient means" to pay
for it.' 4 The Registry, on the other hand, is responsible for the
"administration and servicing" of the Tribunal. 5
Articles 2 through 5 of the Statute establish the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Article 2 provides that the Tribunal
has jurisdiction over "grave breaches" of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, "namely" a series of enumerated acts "against persons or property protected" under the relevant Geneva
Convention provisions. Article 3 confers power on the Tribunal to
prosecute persons "violating the laws or customs of war," including
but not limited to a list of violations culled from the Regulations
annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
9. Id. art 12.
10. Id. art. 11(a).

11. Id. art. 14. The Tribunal's first and current President is Antonio Cassese, an Italian
scholar who specializes in international criminal law. For a list of the Tribunal's personnel,
see Press Communique, U.N. Doc. IT/13, Nov. 30, 1993, reprinted in 2 Morris & Scharf,

supra note 4, at 645.
12. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 7, rule 27.

13. Goldstone's prestige is so great that when he accepted the job of Prosecutor,
President Cassese reportedly faxed to the tribunal judges a traditional message marking
papal succession: "Habemus papumi" ("We have a pope!"). See William W. Home, The
Real Tial of The Century, American Law., Sept. 1995, at 5, 55. Goldstone is scheduled to
be replaced by Louise Arbour, a Candian jurist, in the fall of 1996.
14. Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 21(4)(d).
15. Id. art. 17(1).
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and Customs of War on Land. 16 Article 4 confers jurisdiction over
acts of genocide, defined as any of a set of enumerated acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."' 7 Finally, article 5 covers
crimes against humanity, including a set of enumerated crimes
"when committed in armed conflict, whether international or inter'8
nal in character, and directed against any civilian population.'
The Tribunal got off to a slow start. The process of choosing
judges and a Prosecutor took longer than expected, and, even after
this process was complete, funding difficulties complicated efforts
to assemble a staff for the Prosecutor. For the first year of its existence, the Tribunal had no pending cases. By the end of 1994, the
Prosecutor had sought several indictments, all of which were confirmed by the Tribunal. Eventually the Prosecutor obtained indictments of dozens of individuals, including Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Miadic. Nevertheless, as
1995 commenced, the Tribunal still had no defendants in custody.' 9
II.

PROSECUTOR V. TADIC. THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, owned a cafe in the Prijedor district in northwest Bosnia and worked as a part-time karate instruc-

tor. He had also served in the reserve militia and as a policeman in
the Kozarac area. Although he reportedly had a good relationship

with local Muslims before the war, when ethnic tensions increased
in the early 1990s, he banned Muslims from his cafe.20 Thereafter,
according to the Prosecutor, Tadic participated directly2 in a series

of increasingly inhuman acts against Bosnian Muslims. '

Tadic is said to have helped create death lists of Muslim intellec-

tuals from the Kozarac area. 22 Eyewitnesses say he was personally
involved in the forced removal of Muslims from the villages in the

Prijedor area and in the looting of homes there. 2 He often wore a
16. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
17. Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 4.
18. Id. art. 5.
19. See generally Home, supra note 13 (describing the early days of the Tribunal).
20. See Application for Deferral by the Federal Republic of Germany in the Matter of
Dusko Tadic [hereinafter Application for Deferrall, Annex MK1, para. 6.2 (Declaration of
Michael J. Keegan, Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Keegan Declaration]. This material is
available on the Tribunal's Web Site, supra note 2.
21. See Keegan Declaration, supra note 20, paras. 62-6.8.
22. See id. para. 6.3.
23. See id. para. 6.4.
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military uniform and was "noticeably in charge" of groups engaged
in ethnic cleansing and torture and murder of prisoners in camps.24
Witnesses claim he summarily executed several unarmed non-Serbs
as they were leaving their villages in compliance with Serb
demands.25 Witnesses at the Trnopolje camp, a camp for women,
report that he was involved in the raping of Muslim women on
more than one occasion. 26
The most serious charges against Tadic stem from his actions at
the notorious Omarska camp, which housed relatively prominent
Muslim men. Eyewitnesses place him at the camp almost every
night from late-May to mid-August 1992.27 He beat and tortured
prisoners daily. 28 Prosecutors say he is personally responsible for
the murder of more than ten persons.29 One particularly gruesome
set of murders was one of the "most widely witnessed."' 0 In June
1992, Tadic and others, using knives, truncheons, and metal rods,
beat and tortured three prisoners to the point of unconsciousness.
According to prosecutors, "Tadic then forced a fourth prisoner to
drink motor oil from the garage and then bite off the testicles of
the unconscious prisoners. '31 The three prisoners died as a result
of the torture.32
Tadic eventually traveled to Germany, where he was arrested by
German authorities and charged with crimes relating to his activities in Bosnia. Thereafter, the Tribunal requested from Germany a
deferral of jurisdiction, pursuant to article 9(2) of the Tribunal Statute, which grants the Tribunal primacy over national courts and
permits the Tribunal to request national courts to defer to the Tribunal.33 On February 13, 1995, the Tribunal indicted Tadic and
another Bosnian Serb, Goran Borovnica, for grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 34
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.

id.
id.
id. paras. 6.3-6.6.
id. para. 6.5, 6.7.
id. para. 6.7.
id.
id.

32. See id. For a description of life in the Omarska concentration camp, see, e.g., Rezak
Hukanovic, The Evil at Omarska, in The New Republic, Feb. 12, 1996, at 24. For more on
ethnic cleansing in Prijedor, see Roy Gutman, A witness to Genocide (1993).
33. See Application for Deferral, supra note 20, para 4; Home, supra note 13, at 61.
34. See Indictment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Feb. 13, 1995, available electronically at

gopherJ/gopher.igc.apc.org.7030OO0cases/Tadic/950213-Tadic-indictment.

See also Home,

supra note 13, at 61. The indictment was later amended to include crimes Tadic allegedly
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Subsequently, on June 23, 1995, Tadic's attorneys filed a preliminary motion to dismiss all charges for lack of jurisdiction. 35 The
defense based its motion on three distinct arguments: (1) the
Security Council resolution establishing the Tribunal was invalid;
(2) the Statute's grant of primacy to the Tribunal over national
courts violated international law; and (3) the Tribunal lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because its Statute applies only to crimes
committed in connection with an international (rather than an
internal) armed conflict. The Trial Chamber of the Tribunal heard
oral arguments on the motion on July 25 and 26, 1995.36
On August 10, 1995, the Trial Chamber denied the defense's
motion to dismiss.3 7 The Chamber first considered Tadic's claim
that the Security Council resolution establishing the Tribunal was
ultra vires, or outside the scope of U.N. authority granted by international law. The Chamber observed that the Tribunal "is not a
constitutional court set up to scrutinise the actions of organs of the
United Nations" and suggested that it has "no authority to investigate the legality of its creation by the Security Council. 38 The
Chamber added, however, that it was important that the Tribunal
"be viewed as legitimate," and thus concluded that it would be
"inappropriate to dismiss without comment" the challenge to the
Security Council's authority.39 The Trial Chamber went on to
uphold the Council resolution as a valid exercise of the Council's
powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Chamber first
endorsed the Council's conclusion that violations of humanitarian
law in the former Yugoslavia constituted a "threat to the peace"
justifying sanctions under Chapter VII 4 0 The Chamber then concluded that the particular enforcement measure chosen, in this case
committed at the Keraterm camp, which housed less prominent Muslim men. See Keegan

Declaration, supra note 20, paras. 5.1-5.7 (for a description of Keraterm and other camps).
35. Tadic relied on rule 73(A)(i) of the Rules of Procedure, supra note 7, which permits
the defense to object to proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. Tadic's attorneys were Michail
Wladimiroff of the Netherlands, Milan Vujin, a Bosnian Serb attorney, and one Krstan

Simic. For more on the defense lawyers, see Home, supra note 13, at 56, 62.
36. The Trial Chamber consisted of Presiding Judge Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald of the
United States, Judge Ninian Stephen of Australia, and Judge Lai Chand Vohrah of
Malaysia.
37. See Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra note 3.

38. Id. para. 5.
39. Id. para. 6.
40. Id. para. 16. The Chamber also suggested that the Security Council's conclusion on

this matter was "not a justiciable issue but one involving considerations of high policy and
of a political nature." Id. para. 23. See also id. para. 24 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)).
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establishment of the Tribunal itself, was within the Council's broad
powers under Chapter VII, since the list of'4 1economic and military
measures in article 41 is "not exhaustive."

The Trial Chamber also rejected the defense's contention that
the Tribunal's Statute violates international law because it confers
primacy on the Tribunal over national courts. Here, the Chamber
concluded that Tadic lacked standing to press this issue. The
Chamber noted that the two States "most closely affected" by the
indictment of Tactic, Germany and Bosnia, supported prosecution
of Tadic in the Tribunal.4 2 The Chamber added that the indictment
charges Tadic with "universal" crimes that "shock the conscience of
all nations of the world," 43 and thus were "never crimes within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any individual State.""
Next, the Trial Chamber held that the Tribunal Statute applies to
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia regardless of whether they
were committed in the course of international or internal armed
conflict. First, the Chamber held that article 2 of the Tribunal Statute, which covers "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions,
applies regardless of whether the grave breaches occur in international or internal armed conflict, even though the "grave breach"
provisions of the Conventions apply only in international armed
41. Id. para. 28. The Chamber also suggested that the Tribunal would promote peace in
the region by deterring further human rights abuses and by helping to defuse ethnic
tensions in the region. See id. paras. 30-31.
In addition, the Chamber rejected the defense's contention that the establishment of the
Tribunal violated article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 LL.M. 368, which provides that an accused has the right
to be tried by a tribunal "established by law." The Chamber concluded that this argument
was "but another way of expressing the general complaint that the creation of the
International Tribunal was beyond the power of the Security Council." See Decision of the
Trial Chamber, supra note 3, para. 33.
The Chamber also rejected the defense's argument that Article 29 of the U.N. Charter
does not authorize the Council to establish an international judicial body. The Tribunal
noted that Article 29, which the Tribunal erroneously located in Chapter VI, is worded
very broadly, it provides that the Council "may establish such subsidiary organs" as it
deems necessary. In any event, the Tribunal concluded that the Council had acted
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, not Article 29. See id. para. 35.
Finally, the Chamber rejected arguments that it was inappropriate for the Security
Council to establish personal criminal liability, see id. par. 36, that the Tribunal's creation
violated the principle of jus de non evocando (regularly established courts), see id. para. 37,
that the General Assembly should have been involved in its creation, see id. par. 38, and
that the Tribunal's statute improperly denies the accused any recourse to the Human
Rights Committee or the European Commission of Human Rights, see id. para. 39.
42. Id. para. 41.
43. Id. para. 42.
44. Id. para. 43.
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conflict. The Chamber stressed that "the requirement of international conflict does not appear on the face of Article 2"45 of the
Tribunal Statute and concluded that article 2 is "self-contained
rather than referential. '4 6 Although the Chamber added that
"there are clear indications ... that the acts alleged in the indict-

ment were in fact committed in the course of an international
armed conflict," it nevertheless made no finding on this question. 7
The Chamber also adopted a broad interpretation of article 3 of
the Tribunal Statute, which confers on the Tribunal the power to
"prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war." The
defense argued that this provision is based on the fourth Hague

Convention, 48 which applies only to international armed conflict
and which was cited by the Secretary-General in his report on the

provision.49 The Chamber rejected this contention, noting that the

text of article 3 itself does not mention the Hague Convention.5 0

Asserting that the provision was intended as a codification of customary international law, the Chamber argued that customary
humanitarian law covers both international and internal armed
conflicts. 51 The Chamber also accepted the Prosecutor's argument
that article 3 of the Tribunal Statute incorporates Common Article

3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits serious
crimes com52
mitted in the context of internal armed conflict.
45. Id. para. 50.
46. Id. para. 49.
47. Id. para. 53.
48. Hague Convention IV, supra note 16, art. 3.
49. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, paras. 41-44.
50. See Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra note 3, para. 59.
51. See id. paras. 60-63. In support of this proposition, the Chamber cited the 1863
Lieber Code, which sought to regulate the conduct of U.S. armed forces during the
American Civil War, as well as the traditional rule that the customary law of war applies to
civil war when the rebels become recognized as belligerents. Id. para. 63. The Chamber
also noted that the International Law Commission's Draft Code on Crimes Against The
Peace and Security of Mankind defines "exceptionally serious war crimes" without
distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflict. Id.
52. See id. paras. 65-73. Common Article 3 is incorporated as part of each of the four
1949 Geneva Conventions. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 311618, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136-38; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-290. The Chamber added that the Tribunal
Statute did not violate the ex post facto prohibition of art. 15(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because it adopted provisions that were already
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Finally, the Chamber affirmed that article 5 of the Tribunal Statute covers crimes against humanity in the context of any armed
conflict, whether international in scope or not. The Chamber
rejected the defense's argument that article 5 violated the principle
of nullum crimen sine lege (ex post facto laws) because it extended
to crimes against humanity in the context of internal armed conflict. The Chamber conceded that the Nuremberg Tribunal had
adopted the defense's definition, but the Chamber asserted that in
the fifty years since Nuremberg, customary international law has
removed any requirement of a nexus between a crime against
humanity and any armed conflict. 53 Thus, in the view of the Trial
Chamber, the definition of article 5 "is in fact more restrictive"
than that of customary international law because article 5 requires
a nexus with some sort of armed conflict.- 4
Accordingly, the Chamber held it had subject-matter jurisdiction
over all the counts of the indictment against Tadic. Having also
rejected the defense's challenges to the validity and primacy of the
Tribunal, the Chamber denied Tadic's motion to dismiss. Tadic
immediately appealed.
III. PROCEEDINGS IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

On October 2, 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal
affirmed the ruling of the Trial Chamber, with several revisions.15
The Chamber first rejected the Prosecutor's argument that the
Trial Chamber's decision was unappealable because it did not
relate to jurisdiction. 6 The Appeals Chamber ruled that "[s]uch a
fundamental matter as the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal should not be kept for decision at the end of a potentially
"beyond doubt part of customary international law." Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra
note 3, para. 72. Moreover, Yugoslav law itself had outlawed war crimes against the

civilian population in "situations of 'war, armed conflict or occupation,' irrespective of the
nature of the conflict, thus implying that situations of non-international armed conflict
could be covered." Id. para. 73.
53. Id. paras. 78-83.

54. Id. para. 83.
55. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2. At the time of the decision, the
Appeals Chamber consisted of Presiding Judge Cassese, Judge Li Haopei of China, Judge
Jules Deschenes of Canada, Judge Georges Michel Abi-Saab of Egypt, and Judge Rustam
S. Sidhwa of Pakistan.

56. Id. paras. 4-6. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 7, rule 72(B) (authorizing
interlocutory appeal in the case of "dismissal of an objection based on lack of
jurisdiction").
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lengthy, emotional and expensive trial. '57 The Chamber 5 added:
8
"What is this, if not in the end a question of jurisdiction?
The Appeals Chamber then turned to the first of the three substantive issues decided in the Chamber below-namely, the question of the legitimacy of the Tribunal itself. Like the Trial
Chamber, the Appeals Chamber initially asserted that the Tribunal
is not a constitutional court: "There is no question, of course, of the
International Tribunal acting as a constitutional tribunal, reviewing
the acts of the other organs of the United Nations, particularly
those of the Security Council, its own 'creator."' 5 9 The Appeals
Chamber, following the example of the Trial Chamber, nonetheless
felt obliged to address the legality of the Council's action as a matter of its "incidental" jurisdiction necessary to "ascertain and be
able
to exercise its 'primary' jurisdiction over the matter before
it."' 60 Unlike the Trial Chamber, however, the Appeals Chamber
rejected the Prosecution's argument that the validity of the relevant Council resolution was a nonjusticiable political question.6'
The Appeals Chamber asserted that the International Court of Justice has "consistently rejected this argument62as a bar to examining
a case. It considered it unfounded in law."
With this reasoning, the Chamber proceeded to the underlying
merits of the argument, and ultimately affirmed the Trial Cham-

ber's holding that the establishment of the Tribunal was not ultra
vires the U.N. Charter.63 First, the Appeals Chamber expressed its
view that the Security Council had properly found a "threat to the
peace" within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter-a finding
Tadic had not challenged on appeal. 6' Next, it sustained the Trial
Chamber's holding that the measures in Article 41 "are merely
57. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 6.
58. Id.
59. Id. para. 20.
60. Id. para. 21 (quoting Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 45 (June 21) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on Namibla]).
61. Id. para. 24.
62. Id. The Chamber relied in particular on language from the Certain Expenses
advisory opinion: "It is true that most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations
will have political significance, great or small .... The Court, however, cannot attribute a
political character to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task,
namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision." Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
1962 I.CJ. 151, 155 (July 20), quoted in Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2,
para. 24.
63. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 28-48.
64. Id. paras. 28-30.
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illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other measures. All the Article requires is that they do not involve 'the use of
force."' 65- Finally, like the Trial Chamber below, the Appeals
Chamber found that the establishment of the Tribunal did not violate the human rights principle, codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that courts must be "established
by law."'66 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the first
ground of appeal, thus settling the question of the Tribunal's
legitimacy. 67
The Appeals Chamber next turned to the validity of article 9 of
the Tribunal Statute, which confers primacy on the Tribunal as
against national courts. 68 On appeal, Tadic had argued that the
Trial Chamber should have refused to proceed because Tadic was
"at trial" in Germany,69 and article 10 of the Tribunal Statute generally forbids prosecution by the Tribunal if the accused has
already been "tried by a national court. '70 Noting that the German
proceeding had been in the investigation phase, not in trial, the
Appeals Chamber concluded that Tadic's contentions on this point
"lose all merit."' 71 Still, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Trial
Chamber's conclusion that Tadic lacked standing to challenge the
Tribunal's primacy on grounds of state sovereignty. 72 The Appeals
Chamber held that Tadic "cannot be deprived of a plea so intimately connected with, and grounded in, international law.""3 The
Appeals Chamber nonetheless held that the Tribunal's primacy
does not offend state sovereignty. 74 The Chamber observed that

the Security Council had acted pursuant to Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter and that Article 2(7) of the Charter makes an explicit
65. Id. para. 35. The Appeals Chamber also found that the Security Council had the
power to establish a subsidiary organ with judicial powers, id. paras. 37-38, and that the
Council had discretion to choose this rather than other measures to address the threat to
the peace in the former Yugoslavia, id. paras. 39-40.
66. Id. paras. 46-47; see also id. paras. 41-45 (elaborating on the meaning of "established
by law" as applied to the Tribunal).

67. Id. para. 48.
68. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 17 (establishing the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 51.
Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, arts. 17-18.
Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 52.
Id. para. 55.
Id.
Id. para. 56.
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exception for enforcement measures under Chapter VII.75 Like

the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber stressed that the universal nature of the crimes involved strengthens the case for primacy
of the Tribunal over national courts. 7 6 The Chamber
thus dis77
missed Tadic's objection to the Tribunal's primacy.

The bulk of the Appeals Chamber's opinion is devoted to the
final ground for Tadic's appeal, his claim that the Tribunal lacked
jurisdiction because the alleged crimes were committed in the context of an internal armed conflict. The Chamber rejected Tadic's
suggestion that no armed conflict existed at all at the time of the
offenses in question.78 It then turned to the central issue of subject-matter jurisdiction: whether the Statute covers crimes committed in internal armed conflict. The Appeals Chamber suggested
that any ambiguity in the Tribunal Statute should be read in light of
the Security Council's purpose in establishing the Tribunal, which
was to punish war crimes "without reference to" the nature of the
conflict. 79 It then addressed each particular provision of the Tribunal Statute at issue.
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's holding that
article 2 of the Tribunal Statute, which covers "grave breaches" of
the Geneva Conventions, covers crimes occurring in the context of
both internal and international armed conflict. 80 Stressing that
article 2 is expressly limited to acts against "persons or property"
protected under the relevant Geneva Convention, the Appeals
75. Id. paras. 55-56 (citing U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (preventing the United Nations
from intervening in matters which are within a state's domestic jurisdiction)).
76. See id. paras. 57-60. The Chamber also rejected Tadic's claim that the Tribunal
deprived him of a "right to be tried by his national courts under his national laws." Id.
para. 61. The Chamber could not find such a right in the major international human rights
instruments, and it held that relevant provisions of several national constitutions did not
bar his trial before an international tribunal with sufficient procedural safeguards. See id.
paras. 61-62.
77. Id. para. 64.
78. Id. paras. 66-70. The question is relevant because international humanitarian law,
the substantive law of the Tribunal, generally applies only to armed conflicts. See id. para.
67.
Tadic argued that the armed conflict was not raging at the scene of the alleged crimes
when they were committed. Id. para. 66. The Appeals Chamber concluded that the crimes
nonetheless did take place in the "context" of armed conflict. Id. para. 70. It was enough
that the crimes were "closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the
territories controlled by the parties to the conflict," even if the hostilities were not raging at
the precise scene of the crime. Id.
79. Id. para. 72. According to the Appeals Chamber, the Security Council and the
parties to the hostilities have repeatedly recognized that the conflict was both internal and
international. See id. paras. 72-77.
80. Id. para. 84. See also id. paras. 79-85 (discussing article 2 of the Tibunal Statute).
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Chamber concluded that under the Conventions, persons and
property are protected "only to the extent that they are caught up
in an international armed conflict."8'
The Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's holding that
article 3 of the Tribunal Statute, which covers violations of the
"laws or customs of war,"' 2 applies in both international and internal armed conflict.8s The Chamber observed that the article was
intended to "reference" the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.84 The Chamber reasoned, however, that article 3 of the Tribunal Statute was not
limited to international law established through the Hague Convention (i.e., Hague Law) because the list of offenses in article 3 is
merely illustrative, not exhaustive.13 Indeed, the Appeals Chamber asserted that article 3 covers "all violations of international
humanitarian law other than the 'grave breaches' of the four
Geneva Conventions," the latter already being covered by article
2.8 The Appeals Chamber concluded that article 3 covers violations of Hague law, infringements of Geneva law other than "grave
breaches," violations of relevant agreements among the parties,
and violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
which covers certain conduct committed in non-international
armed conflict.a7 In other words, article 3 "functions as a residual
81. Id. para. 81. The Chamber noted that some national courts have treated "grave
breaches" as encompassing crimes in internal conflict, and that the United States as amlcus
curiae had endorsed that position. Id. para. 83. Although the Appeals Chamber sensed
"the first indication of a possible change in opinio juris of States," id., it nonetheless
concluded that article 2 of the Tribunal Statute is still restricted to international conflicts
"in the present state of development of the law." Id. para. 84.
82. Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating
the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering;,
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity;,
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and
works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
83. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 87-91.
84. Id. para. 87.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. para. 89.
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clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of international
humanitarian law" escapes the Tribunal's jurisdiction.8 Thus,
"[a]rticle 3 aims to make such jurisdiction watertight and
inescapable."89
The Appeals Chamber then turned to Tadic's claim that customary international law-the "customs of war" mentioned by article 3
of the Tribunal Statute-does not extend humanitarian law to
internal strife. While acknowledging that traditional international
law did sharply distinguish between belligerency and insurgency,
the Chamber argued that the distinction has "blurred" since the
1930s. 90 The Chamber cited extensive examples of state practice in
support of its position. 91 It concluded that "customary rules have
developed to govern internal strife," 92 though it conceded that only
"the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation
they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts." 93
The Chamber also held that customary international law recognized that such rules entail individual criminal responsibility. 94
Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that Tadic had abandoned
his ex post facto challenge to article 5 of the Statute, which covers
crimes against humanity when "committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character." 95 The Appeals
Chamber nonetheless declared that "[i]t is by now a settled rule of
customary international law that crimes against humanity do not
require a connection to international armed conflict. ' 96 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's dismissal
of this and similar challenges to the Tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction, 97 thus clearing the way for the trial.98
Several Judges appended separate opinions to the decision.
Judge Li argued that the Tribunal lacked the power of incidental
88. Id. para. 91.
89. Id. The Chamber emphasized that its reading of article 3 extends only to "serious"
violations of humanitarian law. Id. para. 94(iii). As an example, the Chamber suggested
that stealing a loaf of bread in an occupied village would not amount to a "serious"
violation, even though it might violate art. 46(1) of the Hague Regulations. Id.
90. Id. paras. 96-97.
91. See id. paras. 98-125.
92. Id. para. 127.
93. Id. para. 126.
94. See id. paras. 128-136.
95. Id. para. 139 (quoting THbunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 5).
96. Id. para. 141.
97. Id. para. 145. Four Judges joined in the decision. Judge Sidhwa dissented. Id. para.
146.
98. See id. para. 145.

1996]

PROSECUTOR V. TADIC

review of the Security Council resolution establishing the Tribunal.99 Dissenting from the majority's holding that article 3 of the
Tribunal Statute governs internal armed conflict, 1'0 Judge Li also
argued that the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia was international in character.' 0' In his separate opinion, Judge Abi-Saab
joined in the gist of the majority opinion, but expressed some concerns about the majority's reasoning on subject-matter jurisdiction,
particularly regarding the scope of article 2 of the Tribunal Statute.1°2 In a lengthy opinion, Judge Sidhwa dissented from the
majority's holding that the Tribunal had subject-matter jurisdiction
over the case.10 3 Judge Desch~nes filed a declaration concurring in
the majority opinion but lamenting that the opinion was published
only in English, and not simultaneously in French. 1°4
IV. ANALYsis
A. The Legitimacy of the Tribunal
The first issue in the case, whether to review the validity of the
establishment of the Tribunal itself, seems to have confounded the
Tribunal. On the one hand, the Tribunal repeatedly intoned the
mantra that it lacks a power of judicial review. The Trial Chamber
declared that the Tribunal "is not a constitutional court,' 'los and the
Appeals Chamber insisted that "[t]here is no question, of course,
of the International Tribunal acting as a constitutional tribunal,
reviewing the acts of the other organs of the United Nations, par6 On the
ticularly those of the Security Council, its own 'creator."' "01
other hand, both Chambers went on to discuss the validity of the
relevant Council resolution anyway. The Trial Chamber devoted
seven full paragraphs of dicta to the proposition that the Security
99. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, Separate Opinion of Judge Li.

paras. 2-4.
100. See id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Li, paras. 5-13.
101. See id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Li, par. 17.
102. See id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab at 1, 4-6.
103. See id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa, paras. 95-120.
104. See id. at Separate Declaration of Judge J. Deschenes. paras. 1-3.
105. See Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra note 3, para. 5. The Trial Chamber added
that the Tribunal is "a criminal tribunal with clearly defined powers, involving a quite
specific and limited criminal jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to those
specific limits, it will have no authority to investigate the legality of its creation by the
Security Council." Id. See also id. para. 11 (quoting Advisory Opinion on Namlbla, 1971
I.CJ. at 23, which supports the proposition that the International Court of Justice lacks a
power of judicial review).
106. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 20.
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Council's action was a valid exercise of its enforcement power
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.10 7 Similarly, the Appeals

Chamber found that it had a power of "incidental" jurisdiction to
review the validity of the Council resolution, and it upheld the resolution as a valid enforcement measure. 08 The Tribunal thus
behaved much like the International Court of Justice, which has

denied its own power of judicial review even while exercising it. 10 9

The Appeals Chamber's decision raises several interesting
questions. The Appeals Chamber pointed out that an international
tribunal normally has an inherent power to determine its own jurisdiction, known as la compdtence de la competence or Kompetenz-

Kompetenz." 0 This principle of international law stems from the
practice of arbitral tribunals, which often have the power to decide
challenges to their own jurisdiction, perhaps including challenges
to the validity of the underlying contract or compromis itself."1
Competence de la competence ensures that the parties have a forum
for challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal." 2 Even if
another forum for such a challenge exists, competence de la competence allows the parties
to avoid time-consuming and costly refer3
rals to that forum."1

Likewise, the Tribunal's decision in the Tadic case helped ensure
that the Tribunal's legitimacy was tested somewhere. Tadic had a
chance to challenge the Tribunal's legitimacy-an opportunity he
would not have had otherwise.1 4 As Tadic pointed out, human
107. See Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra note 3, paras. 16-22. The Trial Chamber
introduced this excursion with one more disclaimer on judicial review: "Although it is not
for this Trial Chamber to judge the reasonableness of the acts of the Security Council, it is
without doubt that.., the Security Council did not act arbitrarily." Id. para. 16.
108. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 18-20 (citing Nottebohm
Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 7, 119 (March 21)).
109. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 45 (asserting that the Court
does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by
the United Nations organs involved, but then proceeding to review those decisions
anyway).
110. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 18-19. See generally
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Power of the International Court to Determine Its Own
Jurisdiction (1965).
111. See Shihata, supra note 110, at 24-46.
112. See id. at 26.
113. See id.
114. Tadic lacks the authority to bring either a contentious or advisory case before the
International Court of Justice for review of the Council resolution. See U.N. Charter art.
96, para. 2 (providing that only certain U.N. organs may seek advisory opinions); Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1059, 3 Bevans
1179, 1186 (providing that only states may be parties in "cases" before the Court).
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rights law requires trial by a tribunal "established by law."I' s The
question arises, however, whether this human-rights principle is
vindicated when the Tribunal, sitting in its own cause, declares
itself legitimate. Moreover, other (admittedly weak) avenues of
review already exist. For example, states and international organizations have some limited power to challenge the validity of Security Council resolutions such as the one establishing the Tribunal.
There is the possibility of judicial review by the International
1 16
Court, either in a contentious case or an advisory proceeding. 117
Of course, such review has thus far been quite deferential.
Another possibility, admittedly quite dim in this case, is political
persuasion. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for instance, sent
a letter to the Security Council challenging the legal basis for creation of the Tribunal.1 18 Still, the Tribunal's decision made review a
certainty, not just a possibility. In this sense the decision adhered
to the rationales
behind the doctrine of compdtence de la
19
comp~tence.'

Nonetheless, it is one thing to say that an arbitral panel may rule
on its own jurisdiction and perhaps on the validity of an arbitration
agreement between private parties; it is quite another to say that a
subsidiary organ may pass on the validity of a resolution of the
U.N. Security Council, the "top dog" in international law. Even
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, has treated judicial review like a contagious
disease.1 20 And history's most famous war crimes tribunal, the
Nuremberg Tribunal, prospered without permitting challenges to
115. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 41 (quoting International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 14).
116. Cf. U.N. Charter art. 92 (providing that the International Court is the "principal

judicial organ" of the United Nations). On judicial review, see generally Jose E. Alvarez,
Judging the Security Council, 90 Am. J. Int'l L 1 (1996); Geoffrey R. Watson,
Constitutionalsim, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 Harv. Int' LJ. 1 (1993); W.

Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 Am. J. Int'l L 83
(1993); Thomas M. Franck, The Powers of "Appreciation:" Who is the Ultimate Guardian
of UN Legality, 86 Am. J. Int'l L 519 (1992).
117. See Geoffrey R. Watson, supra note 116, at 28.
118. See Letter from the Charge d'Affaires A.L of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia

to the Secretary-General (May 19, 1993), U.N. Doc. A/48170, S125801, reprinted in 2
Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 479. It obviously did not succeed.
119. See Shihata, supra note 110, at 24-26.

120. Indeed, the Court has not made it entirely clear whether it has a power of judicial
review at all. See generally Watson, supra note 116, at 14-28 (surveying the Court's
practice). It has never struck down a Council resolution as ultra vires the U.N. Charter.
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its own legitimacy. The Nuremberg Charter provided that the
Nuremberg Tribunal could not be "challenged" by the parties. 121
The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the International Court
of Justice itself possesses la competence de la compdtence, embodied in article 36(6) of the Court's Statute. 122 Although the Statute
of the International Tribunal has no provision like article 36(6), the
Appeals Chamber stressed that the Tribunal's Statute does not
expressly limit la competence de la competence. According to the
Appeals Chamber, it is "absolutely clear" that no such limitation
can be inferred. 123 The Chamber alluded to suggestions that the
International Court would have compdtence de la competence even
without article 36(6), and that efforts to strip the Court of such
124
competence might be invalid.
The analogy to the International Court's practice, however, is
not conclusive. Even if a norm like article 36(6) is an inherent part
of the Tribunal's Statute, such a norm does not necessarily justify
the "incidental" power of judicial review exercised by the Tribunal.
Article 36(6) has never been cited as authority for "incidental"
judicial review of the International Court's Statute or the U.N.
Charter. Although article 36(6) may empower the Court to deny
validity to so-called "self-judging" reservations in declarations
accepting the Court's jurisdiction, it has never been the basis for a
challenge to the Court's constitutive instruments.
The International Court precedents cited by the Chamber
demonstrate this point. The Nottebohm case, for example, did not
involve review of the instruments establishing the International
Court itelf.'2 5 Nor was the Namibia advisory opinion an example
121. See Charter of the International Military Thbunal, art. 3, annexed to the

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
122. The provision reads: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 36(6), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1179, cited in
Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 18. Article 36(6) is "declaratory of
international arbitration law." W. Michael Reisman, Has the International Court
Exceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 128, 129 (1986). See also Shihata, supra note
110, at 25-26 (asserting that the ICJ possesses la competence de la competence.). Cf. Statute
of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. AT/ll/Rev.4 (1972)
("In the event of a dispute as to whether the Tribunal has competence, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the 'Tibunal."), quoted in Decision of the Appeals Chamber,
supra note 2, para. 17.
123. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 19.
124. See Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 95 (Mar. 21) (separate opinion of
Judge Lauterpacht).
125. Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 119.
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of the "very same 'incidental' jurisdiction" supposed at issue in
Tadic, as the Appeals Chamber tried to suggest.926 True, "in the
exercise of its judicial function," the ICJ in Namibia decided to
"consider" objections to the validity of certain General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions before assessing the consequences
of those resolutions.1-7 But those resolutions had nothing to do
with the legitimacy of the Court itself.
The practice of national courts does not necessarily support the
Tribunal's conclusion either. Many civil-law states follow a centralized model of judicial review in which a single Constitutional Court
passes on the validity of legislation."-m In such a system, subsidiary
courts lack the supposedly inherent "incidental" jurisdiction
described by the Tribunal, which is itself a subsidiary court.12 9
Other states, both common-law and civil-law, do not have any system of judicial review at all.130 In such a system, all courts-even
the highest courts-lack the "incidental" jurisdiction asserted by
the Appeals Chamber. Of course, some states do permit lower
courts to invalidate legislation, but those lower courts rarely have
declared themselves unconstitutional. One of the most famous
instances of judicial review by a national court, Marbury v.
Madison,'13 did involve judicial review of the 1789 Judiciary Act
establishing lower federal courts. But Marbury did not purport to
review the "validity" of the organic document-the U.S. Constitution-that created the Supreme Court itself. Against this background, the Tribunal's decision to assess its own legitimacy seems
novel.
I have argued elsewhere that the International Court can, does,
and should exercise judicial review of acts of the Security Council
and other United Nations organs. 132 Nevertheless, that conclusion
does not mean that other subsidiary tribunals possess a similar
power. The International Court has been reluctant to admit that it
126. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 21.
127. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 45.
128. See generally Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1989).

129. In some such systems, an ordinary court might be required to suspend its
proceedings and certify the constitutional question to the Constitutional Court;
constitutional review might take place before promulgation of the statute, as is the case in
France. See generally Mary Ann Glendon et al., Comparative Legal Traditions 73-118 (2d
ed. 1994).

130. See id. at 468-72 (describing England's resistance to judicial review).
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
132. See Watson, supra note 116, at 27-28, 43 (arguing for a "Jeffersonian" model of
international judicial review).
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possesses any power of judicial review at all. Given that reluctance, it seems a bit daring for a subsidiary tribunal to exercise such
a power, even if couched as an "incidental" one.
Once the Tribunal decided to assess its own legitimacy, it is not
surprising that it validated its own existence. The Appeals Chamber had no trouble upholding the Security Council resolution creating the Tribunal as a valid enforcement measure under Chapter
VII. There is little doubt that the situation in the former Yugoslavia during the period in question constituted a "threat to the
peace" in the region. Establishment of the Tribunal may not be the
best or even a very effective way to restore international peace and
security, but the Charter does not require effective measures. The
list of economic and political sanctions in article 41 is not exclusive.
The only real limitation on the Security Council is that its choice of
sanctions not involve the use of force. 33 The Tribunal's procedural
safeguards also satisfy basic requirements of human rights law.
Thus, after two and a half years of operation, the Tribunal has
validated its own existence. This Bosnian Serb's effort to invalidate a Security Council resolution was no less doomed than the
Bosnian government's effort to invalidate a Security Council resolution imposing an embargo on Bosnia. 34 The theme of these and
other examples of international judicial review is the same:
Review is impossible in theory and deferential in fact. 135
B. Primacy of the Tribunal
The Trial and Appeals Chambers both dismissed Tadic's challenge to the primacy of the Tribunal over national courts. Again,
however, they reached the proper result in different ways. The
Trial Chamber concluded that Tadic lacked standing to assert that
the Tribunal's primacy offends state sovereignty. 136 In support of
its conclusion, the Trial Chamber cited Israel v. Eichmann,3 7 in
which an Israeli court rejected Adolf Eichmann's claim that his
capture had violated the sovereignty of Argentina.
133. See 2 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 42-43 (arguing that art. 41 includes the
power to establish the Tribunal).
134. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
135. Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) (asserting that strict scrutiny is "strict" in theory and "fatal" in fact).
136. See Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra note 3, para. 41.
137. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem 1961), aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277
(Sup. Ct. of Israel 1962).
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The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that Eichmann and other
decisions of national courts imply that an accused lacks standing to

raise violations of state sovereignty. 138 The appellate body nonetheless held that the "traditional doctrine" unjustly deprives the

accused of a plea that is "intimately connected with, and grounded

in, international law. 1 139 The Appeals Chamber, however, did not

specify precisely how the plea is grounded in international law.
The Chamber simply asserted that the traditional standing rule had
been eroded at the hands of "more liberal forces at work in the
democratic societies, particularly in the field of human rights." 4

There is a growing body of authority to support the Appeals
Chamber's position. Individuals have standing to raise many provisions in extradition treaties, such as the political offense exception, or the defense of nationality or non bis in idem.14 ' Human

fights law may also permit an individual to challenge extradition,
even to invoke a provision prohibiting extradition unless the
"Requested State" receives "assurances" satisfactory to it that the
death penalty will not be carried out.142 Further, world reaction to
the Alvarez-Machain decision 4 3 suggests that opinio juris favors
permitting an individual to challenge serious violations of state sov-

ereignty. 44 In light of these sources of authority, the Appeals
Chamber's decision on standing seems justifiable.
Having allowed Tadic to raise state sovereignty, the Appeals

Chamber was right to dismiss his claim on the merits. Neither Germany nor Bosnia had objected to the Tribunal's jurisdiction over
Tadic. Moreover, as both Chambers pointed out, the crimes
138. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 55 (citing Eidhmann, 36
I.L.R. at 62, and United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fia. 1990)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (political offense);
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (nationality). Of course,
extradition practice is not uniform; fugitives may lack standing, for example, to invoke the
rule of speciality. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States §477 cmt. b (1986) (noting that case law on this point is "not consistent")
[hereinafter Restatement]. Similarly, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties sometimes provide
that only states, not individuals, may make requests for evidence or other legal assistance.
See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 19, 1986, U.S.-Thail.. S.
Treaty Doe. No. 18, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Dep't S. Bull. 5.86 (entered into force June 10,
1993).
142. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 28-29 (1989).
143. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
144. See, e.g., Andrew L. Wilder, Recent Development. The Supreme Court Decision in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 979, 992-93 (describing worldvide
criticism of the decision).
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alleged are amenable to universal jurisdiction. If any state could
prosecute Tadic for his alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity, surely it does not offend state sovereignty that an international tribunal could do so instead.
The Appeals Chamber was also justified in rejecting Tadic's
claim that he has a right to be tried by "his national courts under
his national laws.' 1 45 Tadic certainly has a right to a fair trial; he is
not, however, entitled to demand that he be tried only in his home
courts. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is a daily fact of life in
modem international practice, and universal jurisdiction is now a
well-accepted type of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 146
C. The Scope of HumanitarianLaw

The most difficult issue in the case was Tadic's claim that the
Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the offenses charged because they
did not occur in the course of international armed conflict. Tadic's
claim was plausible because humanitarian law traditionally covered
international armed conflict and only limited aspects of internal
armed conflict. The Tribunal's disposition of this issue was
unsettling.
The problems began with the Trial Chamber's interpretation of
article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute, which covers "grave breaches" of
the Geneva Conventions committed against protected persons or
property. The Chamber concluded that this provision extends to
internal armed conflict. It is hard to square this holding with the
language of the Conventions, which define protected persons or
property in terms of international armed conflict. Similarly, there
is no evidence that the Tribunal's Statute was intended to expand
this definition.
The Trial Chamber attempted to bolster its opinion by invoking
the Secretary-General's statement that the Tribunal should apply
rules of international humanitarian law that are "beyond any doubt
part of customary law."' 47 It is far from clear, however, that customary law has expanded the scope of the "grave breaches" system
to internal armed conflict. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does apply some basic human rights norms to internal
conflict, but not as part of the "grave breach" regime. Moreover,
145. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 61.
146. See Restatement, supra note 141, §403.
147. Decision of the THai Chamber, supra note 3, para. 51 (quoting Report of the
Secretary-General, supra note 5, para. 34).
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Common Article 3 does not explicitly impose individual criminal
liability.148 It is true, as noted by the Appeals Chamber, that
opinio juris may be moving toward recognition that grave breaches
encompass violations of Common Article 3.149 Indeed, one can
make a good case that the grave breach regime should apply to
internal armed conflicts. Protection of noncombatants may actually be more urgent in civil war than in international armed conflict, since internal conflict is often as or more vicious than
international war. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber was correct
in finding that state practice has not "beyond any doubt" embraced
the Trial Chamber's interpretation.1 50 Put differently, the Appeals
chamber was right to hold that article 2 of the Tribunal Statute
does not extend to internal conflict.
The question remains, however, whether article 3 of the Tribunal
Statute applies to internal conflict. Article 3 provides that the Tribunal has the power to prosecute "persons violating the laws or
customs of war. 1 5 1 It adds that such violations "shall include, but
not be limited to," a list of activities such as the use of poisonous
weapons, the wanton destruction of cities and civilian institutions,
and the plunder of property.1 5 2 The Trial Chamber concluded that
article 3 applies to international and internal armed conflicts
alike. 53 The Appeals Chamber not only agreed that article 3
applies in both international and internal armed conflict, 15 but also
held that article 3 applies to "all serious violations" of humanitarian law not covered by other provisions of the Statute.1 55 In other
words, the view of the Appeals Chamber is that article 3 not only
applies to any kind of conflict, but also is a residual clause covering
any offense not covered by other provisions of the Statute.
The Tribunal's holding that article 3 extends to civil war is as
bold as it is ill-founded. Although the substantive rule is surely a
desirable one, the text of the provision does not state explicitly that
148. Common Article 3 dictates that "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum," prohibitions on violence.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war, supra
note 52, art. 3.
149. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 83.
150. See id. para. 84.

151. Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 3.
152. Id.

153. Decision of Trial Chamber, supra note 3, para. 74.
154. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 137.
155. Id. para. 92.
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it was intended to apply to internal conflict. Article 3 empowers
the Tribunal to prosecute persons for violations of the "laws or customs of war,"'156 and it provides that "[s]uch violations shall
include, but not be limited to," a variety of offenses relating to the
conduct of military operations. 157 The Appeals Chamber itself
acknowledged that the phrase "laws or customs of war" is a "term
of art used in the past" to describe the traditional law of war, and
that the term was used in the Statute "primarily to make reference
to the 1907 Hague Convention," which applies only to international armed conflict.158 Yet the Chamber argued that the provision was also intended to incorporate a more modem customary
humanitarian law, of which the Hague Convention was only an
"important segment."' 59 According to the Chamber, the "merely
illustrative" list of offenses in article 3 encompasses other offenses
under other conventions. 160 Those other conventions include Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
II to the Geneva
Conventions, both of which apply to internal
61
armed conflict.

The list of offenses in article 3 is of course illustrative, but it does
not follow that article 3 criminalizes all violations of international
humanitarian law, including those conventions that apply to internal armed conflict.' 62 As the Secretary-General wrote, "the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal
should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary law.' 63 The Secretary-General's list of instruments that had "beyond any doubt" become part
of customary international law included the Geneva and Hague
Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and the Nuremberg Charter, but not Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.' 6
Even if Protocol II is "beyond any doubt" part of customary law, it
156. Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 3.
157. Id.
158. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 87 (citing the Hague
Convention IV, supra note 16).
159. Id.
160. Id. See also O'Brien, supra note 6, at 646 ("The elastic 'but not limited to' language
of Article 3 ensures that all relevant, well-established international law falls within the
tribunal's jurisdiction.").
161. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 88-89.
162. Cf. 1 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 72 ("[T]he International Tribunal does not
have unlimited discretion to prosecute and punish persons for the commission of acts other
than those referred to in Article 3 of its Statute.").
163. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, para. 34 (emphasis added).
164. See id.

1996]

PROSECUTOR V. TADIC

does not clearly provide for individual criminal responsibility. 16
The Secretary-General's list would presumably encompass Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,'6 but Common Article
3, like Protocol II, does not clearly impose individual criminal
responsibility. 167 Not surprisingly, the Chamber did not cite any
examples of war crimes prosecutions based on Protocol II or Common Article 3.
The Appeals Chamber nonetheless stressed that after the Security Council approved the Tribunal Statute, four Members of the
Council asserted that article 3 should be interpreted broadly.16S
The U.S. delegate, for example, declared that article 3 "include[s]
all obligations under humanitarian law agreements in force in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the acts were committed, including Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols to those Conventions.''169
Asserting that "no delegate contested these declarations," the
Appeals Chamber concluded that they provided an "authoritative
interpretation" of article 3.170 The Chamber offered no authority
for this theory of interpretation.
The declarations may have some interpretive significance,' 7 1 but
they are hardly dispositive. Most states voting to adopt the Statute
took no position on the precise scope of article 3. Indeed, some
states expressed qualms about the breadth of the Tribunal's authority. The Japanese delegate suggested that "more extensive legal
studies could have been undertaken on various aspects of the Statute, such as the question of the principle of nullum crimen sine
165. See 1 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 78.
166. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 LCJ. 14, 113 (June
27) (holding that Common Article 3 is part of customary international law).

167. See 1 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 78 (noting that Common Article 3 was not a
sufficient basis for defining crimes committed during internal armed conflict because of the

"absence of the recognition of the concept of individual criminal responsibility" in the
provision).

168. See Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3217th Mtg. of the Security Council, May
25,1993, at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 [hereinafter Provisional Verbatim Record] (statement

of the French delegate); id. at 15 (statement of the U.S. delegate); id. at 19 (statement of
the British delegate). The Provisional Verbatim Record, supra, is reprinted in 2 Morris &
Scharf, supra note 4, at 179.
169. Id. at 15.
170. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 88. See also O'Brien, supra
note 6, at 646 (citing these declarations as evidence of the Council's intent).
171. Cf. Military andParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 107 (referring to statements in

the First Committee of the General Assembly).
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lege"172 -a question raised by a broad interpretation of article 3.
The Chinese and Brazilian delegates expressed doubts about this
means of establishing an international criminal court-doubts
clearly implying that those states did not favor an expansive interpretation of the court's Statute.173 The Brazilian delegate also said
that many unspecified but important "legal difficulties" were not
resolved to his government's satisfaction.

74

The Spanish delegate

noted that the Statute could have benefited from improvements,
"especially in determining the substantive subject matter and tem75
poral jurisdiction" of the Tribunal.
Nor is it dispositive that no state "objected" to the interpretations of article 3 offered by the United States, France, and (argua-

bly) the United Kingdom. The reality is that every state's delegate
read a statement prepared or at least vetted in advance by that
state's government. 176 No delegate was authorized to jump up and
"object" when it heard the final version of the U.S. or French
remarks. Moreover, the declarations were made after the delegates
had already voted on the resolution, so no state was on notice of
the P-3's broad interpretation of article 3 until it was too late to

vote "no."
Finally, most of the declarations are themselves ambiguous. The
U.S. delegate was the only representative to make specific reference to Protocol II and Common Article 3.177 The British delegate
172. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 168, at 22 (statement of Mr. Maruyama of
Japan).
173. Cf. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 168, at 26 (statement of Mr. Li
Zhaoxing of China) (the Statute "ought to become effective only after having been
negotiated and concluded by sovereign States and ratified by their national legislative
organs"); Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 168, at 28-29 (statement of Mr.
Sardenberg of Brazil) (arguing that a convention would be the "most appropriate and
effective" method of establishing such a tribunal).
174. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 168, at 29 (statement of Mr. Sardenberg
of Brazil).
175. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 168, at 29 (statement of Mr. Yanez
Barnuevo of Spain).
176. The author was present at the Security Council while Resolution 827 was
"debated." The real debate, of course, took place behind closed doors, as it usually does.
Cf. Reisman, supra note 116, at 97 ("The Security Council is finally working as planned.
Within the Council, the P-5 meet privately to coordinate policy and, within the P-5, the P-3
meet privately to coordinate policy. There is no question about the identity of P-i.").
177. Even the U.S. statement is at odds with a draft of the Statute submitted by the
United States barely six weeks earlier, in which the United States proposed that
jurisdiction include "[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war, including the Hague and
Geneva Conventions. For this purpose, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia ...shall be
deemed to be of an international character." See Article 10(a) of the draft statute
proposed by the United States, in Letter Dated April 5, 1993 from the Permanent
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said vaguely that article 3 is "broad enough to include applicable
international conventions,"1 78 without specifing which conventions
were "applicable." The French delegate said article 3 covered "all
the obligations that flow" from humanitarian conventions in force
at the relevant time.179 He did not indicate, however, whether obligations under Protocol II "flow" from the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, or whether Common Article 3 creates individual criminal responsibility. The Hungarian delegate did say that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal "covers the whole range of international
humanitarian law,"'8 0 but he made no specific reference to article 3
of the Statute, much less to the scope of Common Article 3 or Protocol II.
The state practice cited by the Chamber is no more compelling
than the prepared declarations of a minority of the Security Council. The Chamber conceded that traditional humanitarian law distinguished sharply between international and internal armed
conflict, but it asserted that the distinction has gradually disintegrated as civil strife has become more vicious and large-scale.'"'
The Chamber cited relatively little evidence, however, that state
practice has "beyond any doubt" abandoned this distinction-the
ex post facto standard established in the Secretary General's

report. The Chamber explained the absence of practice on the
grounds that it is difficult to discern the "actual behaviour of the
troops in the field for the purpose of establishing whether they in
fact comply with, or disregard, certain standards of behaviour."'' ls
Unfortunately, it is all too easy to discern evidence that troops in
the field routinely ignore traditional humanitarian law in internal
conflicts. The post-Cold War era alone supplies a depressing list of
lawless civil wars: Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Chechnya, and the
former Yugoslavia.
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the

Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25575 (Apr. 12, 1993), reprinted in 2 Morris & Scharf,
supra note 4, at 451, 454 [hereinafter Draft Statute]. This provision implies that cognizable

violations of the "laws or customs of war" must take place in international armed conflict.
The U.S. draft of the Statute might simply imply that the United States believes that only
violations of Geneva law, not violations of Hague law, must take place in international
armed conflict. But such an implication is inconsistent with the U.S. amicus brief in Tadic.
which asserts that Geneva law does not presuppose an international armed conflict. See
Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 83.
178. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 168, at 19.
179. Id. at 11.
180. Id. at 20.
181. Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 97.
182. Id. para. 99.
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Instead of state practice, the Chamber relied principally on perceived changes in opinio juris since the adoption of the Hague and
Geneva Conventions. 83 Some states have endorsed the extension
of humanitarian law to internal conflicts.'84 The U.N. General
Assembly has twice declared, in non-binding resolutions, that
humanitarian law applies to all types of armed conflicts. 85 Moreover, parties to internal conflict have on occasion promised to
apply humanitarian law to civil war.1 86 But other authority is to the

contrary. In its comments on the establishment of the Tribunal, the
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) said that

"according to International Humanitarian Law as it stands today,
the notion of war crimes is limited to situations of international

armed conflict."' 7 The ICRC, of course, is charged with the application of humanitarian law.'88 In its comments, the U.S. government proposed that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia be
"deemed to be of an international character," thus ensuring that
traditional humanitarian law would apply; the implication is that

there was some doubt that all humanitarian law would apply to an
internal conflict. 189 A number of commentators have also
183. See id.
184. For example, the British government and the Assembly of the League of Nations
asserted that humanitarian law applied to the Spanish Civil War. See id. paras. 100-101.
Mao Tse-Tung ordered the Chinese peoples' liberation army not to kill or humiliate
members of Chiang Kai-shek's army. See id. para. 102.
185. See G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
Both are quoted in Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 110-11.
186. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, paras. 103-107 (citing
examples from parties to civil conflict in Yemen, the Congo, Nigeria, and El Salvador). As
the Chamber pointed out, this practice is envisioned by Common Article 3, which calls on
parties to internal conflict to adopt special agreements to apply international humanitarian
law to the conflict.
The Chamber also noted that the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
has endorsed the extension of humanitarian law to internal conflict. See id. para. 109.
187. Some Preliminary Remarks by the International Committee of the Red Cross on
the Setting-Up of an International Tibunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, DDM/JUR/422b (Mar. 25, 1993), at 2, reprinted in 2 Morris & Scharf,
supra note 4, at 391-92 [hereinafter Preliminary Remarks].
188. See id.
189. See U.S. Draft Statute, supra note 177, art. 10(a). In addition, the Commission of
Experts appointed before the establishment of the Tribunal said it "understands the
general notion of war crimes as comprising any violation of the law of international armed
conflicts." See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), para. 47, in Letter from the Secretary-General to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993), reprinted in 2 Morris &
Scharf, supra note 4, at 311, 320 [hereinafter Commission of Experts Report]. The
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expressed the view that the law of international armed conflict
does not yet extend to internal armed conflict.190 Given the disagreement about the question, it seems unlikely that customary law
has "beyond any doubt" applied norms of international armed conflict to internal conflict. Again, this is not to say that such an
extension is not warranted-only that it must be carried out prospectively, not retrospectively.
Even if customary law does extend the traditional law of war to
internal conflict, it does not "beyond any doubt" impose individual
criminal responsibility in such circumstances. Only a few of the
authorities cited by the Chamber explicitly support individual crim-

inal liability for violations of international humanitarian law in

time of civil war. 191 The Chamber cited few examples of actual war

crimes trials arising out of internal conflict, l 92 and no examples of
war crimes trials involving violations of Protocol H. To be sure,
Commission nonetheless argued for applying the law of international armed conflict to the
situation in the former Yugoslavia because of the "character and complexity of the armed
conflicts involved" and because the parties had negotiated agreements on humanitarian
issues that may have extended some of the law of international armed conflict to the
Yugoslav conflict. See id. paras. 43-45, reprinted in 2 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 319.
As Morris and Scharf argue, the special agreement reached by the parties to the Bosnia
conflict "excluded the provisions of the Geneva Conventions concerning individual
criminal responsibility." 1 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 46 (citing Agreement of May
22, 1992, at 30, U.N. Doc. Sf25392).
190. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, Foreign
Aff., Summer 1993, at 122, 128 ("Were any part of the former Yugoslav conflict deemed
internal rather than international, the perpetrators of even the worst atrocities could not be
prosecuted for grave breaches or war crimes."). Meron nonetheless asserts that "broad
consensus" exists that the fighting constituted an international armed conflict. Id. See also
1 Morris & Scharf, supra note 4, at 57 (asserting that a person responsible for killing
innocent civilians in the course of internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia "could not be
charged with war crimes that can only be committed during an international armed
conflict").
191. See Decision of the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 106 (citing court-martials
and executions of Nigerian soldiers for atrocities committed during the Biafra rebellion);
id. para. 131 (citing the German military manual, which apparently extends some aspects of
traditional humanitarian law to internal conflict). Other examples cited by the Appeals
Chamber seem more ambiguous. For example, it cited the Yugoslav Criminal Code of
1990, which implemented the Geneva Conventions by making them applicable "at the time
of war, armed conflict, or occupation." Id. para. 131. The term "war" might traditionally
have been taken to mean only international armed conflict, though that reading is
admittedly more doubtful today. The Chamber cited another Yugoslav law that, under the
Yugoslav Constitution, made the two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions "directly
applicable," see id. para. 132, but again Protocol I does not make explicit provision for
individual criminal liability.
192. The only actual "war crimes trials" cited by the Chamber were court-martials, and
eventual executions, of Nigerian soldiers who committed murder during the Biafra conflict.
See id. para. 106.

716

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 36:687

there have been trials of individuals for atrocities committed in the
course of arguably internal armed conflict. 193 In most such cases,
however, the tribunals have applied national law rather than international humanitarian law. 194 Again, individual criminal responsibility is doubtless the most desirable rule, 195 but the Statute was
explicitly designed to avoid ex post facto application of new rules,
even desirable ones. 96
This feature of the Statute distinguishes it, at least nominally,
from the Nuremberg Charter, on which the Chamber relied as precedent. The Nuremberg Tribunal held that the criminalization of
"crimes against peace" in the Nuremberg Charter did not violate
the principle nullum crimen sine lege even though there was little
explicit authority that waging an aggressive war exposed one to
individual criminal liability. 197 But neither the Nuremberg Charter
nor any related instruments made any explicit reference to the
principle nullum crimen sine lege. Indeed, in its decision the Tribunal maintained that because the Charter made war of aggression a
crime, "it is therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether
and to what extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution
of the London Agreement."' 198 In other words, the Tribunal
doubted that it was bound by the ex post facto rule at all. Moreover, the Tribunal conceived of the rule not as a "limitation of sovereignty" but "in general [as] a principle of justice," one that
presumably might give way to other countervailing principles of
justice, such as avoiding the injustice of permitting Nazi war
criminals to walk free.' 99 After the Nuremberg Tribunal, some
193. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R.), aff'd, 22 C.M.A. 534,
48 C.M.R. 19 (1973), petition for writ of habeas granted sub nom. Calley v. Calloway, 382
F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976).

194. "Major war crimes trials in more recent years, all based on national rather than
international law, include Israel's trials of Adolf Eichmann and John Demjanjuk, France's

trial of Klaus Barbie, and the United States's trials of Lieutenant William Calley, Captain
Ernest Medina, and others in connection with the massacre of civilians at My Lai in South
Vietnam." Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 640 (1992).
195. See generally Lyal S. Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for
Serious Human Rights Violations (1992) (arguing that a general norm of individual
criminal responsibility is emerging).
196. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, para. 34.
197. See The Trial of Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany, Part 22, 445, 447 (1950), quoted in Decision of
the Appeals Chamber, supra note 2, para. 128.
198. The Trial of Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany, supra note 197.
199. Id.
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commentators also suggested that the ex postfacto rule deserves at

most a limited role in international law.200 Other contemporary
writers, however, criticized this aspect of the Nuremberg
decision. 0 1
The blossoming of human rights law in the fifty years since
Nuremberg has removed any doubt that the ex post facto norm is
part of international law. It is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 ° and in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.02 3 This development, together with the
express endorsement of the principle in the Secretary-General's
report on the Statute, suggests that the Nuremberg holding on ex
post facto laws is not controlling.
It might be argued that the ex post facto principle should not bar
a change in the technical elements of an offense when the conduct
engaged in was already clearly criminal. Indeed, one purpose of
the ex post facto principle is to ensure that the accused has notice
that his or her conduct is illegal. z 4 Tadic surely knew that murder
and torture was illegal in Yugoslavia. The ex post facto doctrine,
though, serves a second, equally important purpose; it guards
against abuse of power by the sovereign 0 5 It forces the sovereign
to decide in advance what conduct will be criminal, ensuring that
the sovereign cannot selectively pick and choose potential defendants after the fact. It is both a right of the accused and a restriction
200. See, e.g., John Alan Appleman, Military Tibunals and International Crimes 48
(1954) ("For in international law there is no restriction as to ex post facto law-the
question can be only the enforcement of law which is found in the common conscience and
which is not subject to quick mutation.") The author adds that the American rule against
ex post facto laws "is, historically, a pure accident." Id. at 49. See also F. B. Schick, The
Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future, 41 Am. J.Int'l L 770,793 (1948)
(expressing skepticism that ex post facto doctrines are "expressive of a general practice
accepted as law by civilized nations") (footnote omitted).
201. See, e.g., George A. Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 Am. J.
Int'l L. 20, 34, 36 (1948) (arguing that the judgment violates American conceptions of the
ex post facto principle, and that "[a]n indefinable act cannot be prohibited in advance
unless we are willing to acknowledge our constitutional heresy with respect to er post facto
legislation"); cf. Schick, supra note 200, at 784 ("De lege ferenda the dictum of the...
Tribunal [imposing individual criminal liability for recourse to illegal Nvar] is of far-reaching
importance. De lege lata the judgment does not correspond with the rules of general
international law.").
202. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, art. 11(2), at 71, U.N. Doe. A810 (1948).
203. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 15(1).
204. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National
Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L 235, 289 (1993).
205. See id.
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on the government. Viewed from this perspective, the Tribunal's
retroactive amendment of humanitarian law seems inappropriate.
The ex postfacto doctrine was also defined in very strict terms by
the drafters of the Tribunal's Statute, who imposed a high standard
on the law of the Tribunal-that it reflect existing law "beyond any
doubt." Measured by this standard, the Tribunal's extension of
existing humanitarian law does not seem justified.
This is not to suggest that Tadic should have escaped prosecution
for war crimes. The Chamber could have enforced the ex postfacto
principle, thereby refusing to extend the law of international armed
conflict to internal conflict, and still ensured that Tadic and his ilk
would face trial. The Tribunal could have deemed the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia as international in character. Indeed,
there already was a broad consensus to that effect.2 0 6 The Tribunal
seemed receptive to such an argument, but it declined to reach the
question. 0 7
The Tribunal's final holding-that article 5 of the Tribunal Statute applies to any type of conflict, international or internal-is
eminently sensible. The plain text of the provision states that it
applies to all conflicts, "whether international or internal in character. ' 20 8 The Tribunal's interpretation of the provision is consistent
with the nullum crimen principle because it imposes a greater burden on the prosecution than is now required under customary
international law. That is, the provision requires the prosecutor to
prove the existence of some armed conflict even though customary
international law does not seem to require an armed conflict.
In sum, the Appeals Chamber was right to confine article 2 of
the Tribunal Statute (criminalizing "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Conventions) to international armed conflict, but it went too far in
applying article 3 (criminalizing "laws and customs of war") to
both international and internal strife. Its interpretation of article 5
is consistent with the text of the Tribunal Statute and with custom-

ary international law.

206. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 190, at 128; Commission of Experts Report, supra note
189, at para. 43-45; Draft Statute, supra note 177, art. 10(a); O'Brien, supra note 6, at 640.
207. Of course, even if the Tribunal found that the conflict was purely internal, it could
still have tried Tadic for crimes against humanity. Such a case would be more difficult to
prove because the prosecutor must show that the defendant's actions were directed against
a civilian population. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 5, art. 5.
208. Id.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Critics of the Nuremberg judgment derided it as "victors' justice." 2 9 The Nuremberg Tribunal was exacting lawless vengeance
that only served to "disguise... the real sources of international
disturbance1 210 and to fuel the resentments of the loser, much as
the Treaty of Versailles had angered Germans after World War 1.11
These arguments have been proven wrong. Far from disguising the
nature of evil, the Nuremberg trial showcased the full extent of the
Nazi horror, helping to ensure that it did not rise again. Instead of
sparking a new Nazism, the trial helped usher in a half century of
peace, albeit a cold peace, throughout Europe.
Will the new International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia be as successful? It has only a few men in custody, and
high-ranking indictees like Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Miadic
remain at large. Nonetheless, the Tribunal has had a positive influence on developments in Bosnia-the primary example being the
limitation of Karadzic's role in recent elections.2 12 The Tribunal
has also performed an "expressive" function. 213 Tadic's trialbroadcast live on Court TV-helped dramatize the atrocities of
Omarska to the rest of the world. The Trbunal's decision to
extend the law of international armed conflict to internal armed
conflict does not honor the principle of nullem crimen sine lege, but
at least it will set a precedent for prospective application of such an
interpretation-a rule that makes sense in a world of vicious civil
strife. Moreover, the Tribunal is not vulnerable to the charge that
it dispenses "victor's justice." The principle sponsors of the Tribunal were hardly the "victors" in the Balkan war. Many "victors"
are now in the dock. The witnesses for the prosecution in the Tadic
trial have been the victims of the conflict, not the victors. This is
not victor's justice; it is victim's justice.

209. See, e.g., Montgomery Belgion, Victors' Justice 187 (1949) ("[N]othing is to be

gained after a war by the punishment of the vanquished by the victors, even if the
vanquished have been to blame for the war itself.").
210. Id. at 6.
211. See id. at 5-6, 187. The "worthless" verdict of the Tribunal relied on a "totalitarian

notion of justice" involving a "sinister pretension to administer international law." Id. at
186.
212. Cf. David J.Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, Foreign Pol'y, Spring
1996, at 34, 42-47 (describing the Tribunal's role in the Dayton Accords).
213. Cf. Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 185-217 (1982) (describing the expressive

function of constitutional decision-making).

